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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WALTER LEE CHAMBLEE,
by and through his
guardian ad Litem,
Gertrude Elkins,
Plaintiff an.d .Appellant,
-vs.-

Case
No. 8666

JOHN STOCKS and
RAY TIBBETTS,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT'S
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set forth in plaintiff's brief
are stated from the plaintiff's standpoint entirely. The
defendant's version of the facts and the testimony submitted by witnesses called by the defense show that the
plaintiff was picked up for questioning by the Sheriff
and Ray Tibbetts, Deputy Sheriff, on April 27, 1955, at
the Pick Service Station at Moab at between 7:00
1
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o 'clock and 7 :30 in the evening ( Tr. 145, 247). Prior to
this time the Sheriff and Deputy Tibbetts had been to
Price to an F. B. I. School. They were through with
the School at around 4 :30 and left Price and came back
to Moab in the Sheriff's car (Tr. 145, 245). They
arrived in Moab just about dark. Prior to leaving Price
Sheriff Stocks had received a telephone call from Sheriff Snyder of Vernal asking him to locate John Edwin
Davis, who was _also sometimes referred to in the tes,
timony as Edwin John Davis (Tr. 145, 245). Sheriff
Snyder instructed Sheriff Stocks to pick up Davis and
place him in the Grand County jail and then call him
collect when he had him in custody.
Both the Sheriff and Deputy Tibbetts talked to the
plaintiff in the Sheriff's automobile for 10 or 15 minutes
and asked him about a geiger counted that had been recently stolen and about passing marijuana cigarettes
which the plaintiff denied (Tr. 146, 149, 150, 249, 250).
Stocks and Tibbetts, then, without using any force or violence or threats in any manner, released the plaintiff from
the car ( Tr. 151, 250). They then went oYer to the Colorado River looking for John Edwin Davis for the Sheriff
of Uintah County (Tr. 251). They droYe up the River
Road to Nigger Bill Canyon, turned around and came
back to the bridge and drove up the other side of the River
and located Davis on the North side of said River (Tr.
154, 253). Davis was picked up about 8:00 to 8:30p.m.
and was then taken to the Grand County jail in l\Ioab
where Sheriff Stocks placed a collect call to Sheriff
Snyder at Vernal to inform him that he had Davis in

2
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custody (Tr . .157, 254). They waited from 30 minutes to
an hour to get this call through to Snyder but were
un$uccessful in contacting him (Tr. 1~7, 254). Later on in
the evening around midnight Police Officer Leach informed Sheriff Stocks that there was a call for him from
Sheriff Snyder at Vernal ( Tr. 106, 163, 210). Sheriff
Stocks and Deputy Tibbetts returned to the office where
the call was taken from Sheriff Snyder at Vernal, and
the Uintah County Sheriff was advised that Davis had
been taken into custody and arrangements were made
for Davis to be held in Moab until the following day
'vhen Sheriff Snyder would come for him. After waiting
30 minutes to an hour for this telephone call to Sheriff
Snyder, the Sheriff and Deputy Tibbetts then went to
the downtown area of Moab on patrol duty (Tr. 158, 255).
They talked to Reed Somerville in front of the 66 Club
( Tr. 158, 263, 341). While talking to Reed Somerville a
Theodore Gibson drove up the street with some loud
pipes on his car. Tibbetts remarked that this was the
hotrod that they had been trying to catch (Tr. 159, 264).
Tibbetts and the Sheriff then left in the Sheriff's car and
overtook Theodore Gibson in his hotrod and Tibbetts
gave him a ticket for excessive noise (Tr. 160, 161, 264,
265, 266, 320).
Warren Kent Somerville, who is the son of Reed
Somerville, was called as a witness and he testified that
he was in the car with Theodore Gibson and that they
'vere stopped by the Sheriff and Deputy and that Tibbetts
gave Gibson a ticket for excessive noise ( Tr. 320). Warren Kent Somerville testified that Gibson got thic ticket
3
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between 8 and 10:00 p.m. (Tr. 320). He further testified
that thereafter they were driving up and down the streets
in Moab and they saw the Sheriff and Tibbetts a couple of
times again that evening before midnight (Tr. 321, 324).
At the time Gibson was given a ticket the Sheriff removed
a half case of beer from the car ( Tr. 160, 265, 319). Reed
Somerville was the probation officer and the testimony
shows that Warren Kent Somerville, the son, and Reed,
the father, had a very firm discussion about this beer
being in the car, which makes this occasion o~ being
stopped by the Sheriff and Deputy very vivid in the memory of Warren Kent Somerville (Tr. 320, 339).
Bert Dalton, Justice of the Peace, was called as a
witness and he testified that on April 29, Deputy Tibbetts
appeared before him and made complaint against Theodore Gibson for committing the crime of excessive noise
on April 27, 1955. A photostat of the Justice of the
Peace's Docket was received in evidence as Exhibit 9
(Tr. 331).
Kay Young was called as a witness. He testified that
he was in the downtown area of Moab on April 27 in the
evening, that he saw the Sheriff's ca.r twice, once at the
Standard Oil Bulk Plant, and the second time on l\fain
Street. That he saw them there after 8:00 p.m.
(Tr. 225, 226).
Danny Bittle testified that on April 27 he "rent to
the show at Moab and 'vas downtown around 9 :00 to 9:30
in the evening, that he saw the Sheriff and Deputy Tibbetts at the intersection of Fern's Cafe on Main Street,
4
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that he talked to them at around 10 :00 to 10 :30 p.m. and
he saw .them again at the Arches Cafe after 11 :00 p.m.
(Tr. 232, 233).
In the contrast to this the plaintiff, Walter Lee
Chamblee, testified that he was taken into custody by
Sheriff Stocks and Deputy Tibbetts between 7 :00 and
7 :30 that evening ( Tr. 67), that they took him over to
some butane tanks where he claimed that they beat him
up; that around 8 :20 to 8:30 they took him up the .Colorado River to Nigger Bill Canyon (Tr. 78), that they
'vere with him continuously until 5 or 10 minutes after
12 o'clock midnight (Tr. 79), and that he was with them
continuously between 41/2 and 5 ·hours that evening from
about 7:00 p.m. until about 12:10 a.m. (Tr. 79).
Chamblee also testified that after the Sheriff and
Deputy left him at 5 or 10 minutes after midnight in
Nigger Bill Canyon,. after he had been hit and beaten,
that he was unable to walk, that he crawled about 75 feet
down to the creek, and that as he went do,vn the River
Road he would walk and run and crawl (Tr. 28, 82, ·83);
that he crawled on his hands and knees 4 or 5 times. He
further testified that the waist overalls he had on while
he was doing all this crawling 'vere the same ones that
were introduced as evidence in Court (Tr. 22, 83), which
clothing was made available for examination by the jury
to determine whether, in their opinion, Chamblee did
crawl through the creek bed and do,vn the River Road as
he had testified.
There 'vas a direct conflict in much of the evidence
5
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and the jury was called upon to determine who was telling
the truth. The jury heard evidence from the Sheriff and
his Deputy and several witnesses called by the defense
that ~he Sheriff and Deputy were in the downtown Moab
area performing their duties as officers during the time
that Chamblee claimed they had him in Nigger Bill Canyon hitting and abusing him. The jury, after hearing the
evidence, apparently believed the testimony of the defense witnesses and returned a verdict of no cause
of action.
Doctor Winston S. Ekren attended Chamblee at the
Moab hospital. He stated that in his examination he saw
some red marks on Chamblee's chest and back (Tr. 38,
53), but did not recall seeing any marks on his face (Tr.
40, 54) . He further stated that he noticed no bleeding
at the mouth or the nose (Tr. 49), and observed no loose
hair or bald spots where the hair had been pulled out as
claimed by Chamblee (Tr. 54). There were no bruises or
marks observed by the doctor on his legs or in the groin
area (Tr. 55). The doctor stated his opinion that Chamblee was complaining more than was justified from his
examination (Tr. 55). X-ray was made of the chest area
which revealed no bone injury (Tr. 56). The bruise
marks on the chest were described by the doctor as being
mildly red, and that they never did change color into
black and blue marks (Tr. 54); he further stated that he
did not observe any cuts or lacerations on Chamblee (Tr.
53). The doctor's physical examination of Chamblee did
not bear out the claim of plaintiff that he had been hit and
beaten to the extent and in the manner that he testified.
6
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ARGUMENT
I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GRANT A CHANGE OF VENUE.
Plaintiff claims as Point No. 1 that "the trial Court
abused its discretion in refusing to grant a change of
venue on plaintiff's motion." The record shows that on
May 25, 1956, plaintiff ~led· a motion for change of place
of .trial, and in support thereof, attached the following
Affidavit of Robert W. Hughes, attorney for plaintiff:
Comes now Robert W. Hughes, attorney for plaintiff, in the above entitled cause, who first being
duly sworn upon his oath deposes and says :
That he is well acquainted with the defendant,
John Stocks, in the above entitled matter, and he
is well acquainted with many of the residents in
Moab City and Grand County; that said John
Stocks is an elected public official of Grand County,
to wit: Sheriff; that said John Stocks is a member
of one of the oldest families in Moab and Grand
County; that his relatives are numerous and his
relatives, acquaintances and friends are innumerable in Grand County. Therefore, it would be
almost impossible to procure an impartial jury for
the trial of this matter and that deponent believes
that an impartial trial cannot be had in the aforesaid County designated in plaintiff's Complaint,
and that the place of trial for this action should
be transferred to Carbon County, Price, Utah,
"\Vherein the relatives and friends of said John
Stocks are not so numerable.
Dated this 23rd day of May, 1956.
7
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The hearing on said motion was held on June 18, 1956,
and the proceedings thereof are reported in the trial
transcript of testimony commencing at page 356. Discussion was had as to possible difficulty in getting a jury
(Tr. 359), whereupon the Court denied the motion and
stated "If we can't get a jury, then we will consider
whether we should move the trial for another place of
trial or not'' ( Tr. 361). The motion for change of place
of trial was again renewed by plaintiff in chambers on
the day the trial began following the choosing of a panel
of 14 prospective jurors. The hearing on said motion is
reported commencing at page 6 of the transcript of testimony. The grounds presented "\vere that the prospec. .
tive jurors all knew and were acquainted with the
defendants ( Tr. 6), that all of the prospective jurors had
heard about the case (Tr. 8), and that the case involved
public officials (Tr. 9). After discussion, the Court stated
that it was impressed that remarkable success ha.d been
had in getting 14 open-minded men and women as jurors
(Tr. 10), and denied the motion.
The plaintiff claims reversable error on the ground
that the Court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for change of venue. Section 78-13-9 U.C.A., 1953, specifies the grounds upon which the Court may change the
place of trial. It is noted that the language used in said
statute is discretionary. It reads as follows:
''The Court may, on motion, change the place of
trial in the following eases :

•
(2) When there is reason to believe that an
8
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impartial trial cannot be had in the county,
city or precint designated in the complaint.''
(Emphasis added)
In construing the meaning of said statute, the Utah Court,
in Anderson vs. Johnson, 1 U. 2d 400, 268 P. 2d 427, at
page 404, stated:
''Our statute is so worded that it necessarily is left
to the option of the trial court in all cases involving
prejudice of the people locally, to decide whether
conditions are such that the requirement of justice "\vould be best subserved by a change.
''There would seem to be no room for contest
where the statute makes the allowance of a change
discretionary with the court.
''A trial court's ruling on such a rna tter will not
be considered to have been an abuse of discretion
unless the court acted unfairly or by whim or
caprice or practically denied justice in the case.''
The question of local bias is largely one of fact and is,
therefore, peculiarly within the province of the trial
judge. The record in the instant case clearly shows that
the court gave due consideration to the grounds raised
by the plaintiff. In ruling upon the original motion the
Court recognized that the controlling factor in determining whether a change in the place of trial should be
made would be the ability or inability to obtain an imparital jury at the time of trial ( Tr. 361). The Court
joined in the interrogation of the prospective jurors as
to their acquaintance with the defendants, whether or
not their acquaintance with the defendants would influence them one way or another in rendering a fair and
9
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impartial verdict based upon the evidence and the law
in the case, whether they had heard about the case, or
discussed the case with the defendants, and if they had
formed any opinion concerning the merits of . the case
from .what they had heard (Tr. 3, 45). Juryman Ellis
testified, as stated in plaintiff's brief, that it might
embarrass him to render a judgment against the Sheriff,
but in answer to further questioning by the Court, he
stated that he would be willing to follow the direction of
the Court and decided the case on the evidence irrespective of his long acquaintance with the Sheriff {Tr. 4).
Having had opportunity to observe the jurors first hand,
the Court concluded that the claim of the plaintiff that
a fair and impartial trial could not be had was unfounded,
as witness his statement "Well it seems 've have had remarkable success in getting 14 men and 'vomen there
that are as open-minded as they are in this type of a
case in this vicinity" (Tr. 10). On the basis of the record
it cannot be said that the Court, in denying plaintiff's
motion, ''acted unfairly or by whim or caprice, or practically denied justice in the case.''
Traditionally, the law respects the right of a defendant to defend an action against himself within the
County of his residence, unless other factors are of
sufficient weight as to justify the place of trial to be
moved. The fact that one litigant is "~idely known in
the County of residence ",.hereas another is relatively
unknown assuredly is not such a circumstanee as dictates
a ruling that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had.
That mere acquaintance or popularity is not sufficient
10
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grounds to require a change of venue, see Krehbiel v.
Goering, 293 P. 2d 255, a 1956 Kansas case, in which it was
held that refusal to change the place of trial on defendant's allegation that plaintiff was a resident of the County
and defendants non-residents, and plaintiff was personally acquainted with a large number of persons qualified
to serve as jurors so that defendants could not have a
fair and impartial trial, was not an abuse of discretion.
The California Court, in J. I. Case Threshing Machine Company v. Copren Bros., et al. 169 Pac. 443, was
called upon to rule upon a similar question in a case having almost analogous facts to the case at bar. The affidavit
in support for a motion for change of venue provided,
inter alia, as follows :
" ... that the said plaintiff is practically unacquainted in the said County; that the said defendants . . . were born and raised in the said
county, and are well and favorably known
throughout its entire length; that they lived there
nearly, if not entirely, the whole of their lives, and
are at this time, mature men; that the County is a
sparsely settled County, and the acquaintanceship
of the said defendants extends throughout its
course and length; that one of the said defendants
.... has, for a number of years, occupied the position of county assessor of said County, and is of
wide and consequential influence therein.''
It further appeared that the population of said county
was approximately 5,000. Although a much stronger case
for change was there made than in the instant case, the
Court denied the motion for change of venue and at page
447 stated as follows:
11
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'' lt is conceivable that a showing might be made
of a prejudice against a plaintiff so widespread,
intense and outspoken through the public press
and otherwise as to warrant a conclusion that the
plaintiff would not have a fair trial where the
action was pending. But it must be conceded that,
without making an attempt to secure an impartial jury, it would require something more than a
showing that the defendants are well and favorably known throughout the entire length of the
county, and that one of them is of wide and consequential influence therein because he had been entrusted with the offioo of county assessor.
The Court also stated at page 446:
''It is an unwarranted inference that an impartial
jury cannot be called from the citizens of that
county capable of impartially trying a case between a foreign corporation and residents therein
simply because these persons are widely and favorably known in the county.''
In Reyher, et al., v. Mayne, 10 P. 2d, 1109, the Colorado Court, in 1932, was called upon to determine whether
or not the trial Court had abused its discretion in denying a motion for change of venue made by the defendants
in a civil case wherein plaintiff was Sheriff of the County
in which suit was brought. The Court states at page 1110
as follows:
''The a pplica.tion for change of place of trial was
based on the alleged bias of the people of the
county of the venue of which plaintiff "~as Sheriff,
making it impossible, so it 'vas said, to secure an
impartial jury.... We haYe repeatedly held that
in the absence of abuse of discretion the trial
12
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Court's determination of the question is controlling on review.... The application is novel only in
that plaintiff was Sheriff of the County where
the cause of action arose and where he was seeking
judicial redress. Such fact, while necessarily
challenging the Court's best consideration and
solemn judgment, constituted only an element and
does not authorize a change as a. matter of right.
Examination of the record indicates the Court
sensed the gravity of the point and that in making
determination there was no abuse of discretion.''
}

Plaintiff emphasizes in his brief the contact which a
sheriff has with persons called to serve as jurors. Plaintiff does not claim, however, any particular acts on the
part of the defendants whereby plaintiff was prejudiced
other than in the general allegation that the jurors were
acquainted with the Sheriff. Nothing specific is claimed
whereby defendants used their offices to the damage of
plaintiff. It should be pointed out that the contact which
a Sheriff has with those chosen to serve as jurors is ministerial only. In the absence of a shortage of jurors the
Sheriff has nothing whatsoever to do with the determination of who is to be chosen to act in this capacity. It
is submitted that presenting the persons drawn for jury
duty with notice of their selection and attending the jury
while in Court are not such contacts as necessarily endear
the Sheriff to the hearts of those so called.
The cases relied upon by plaintiff in support of his
claim that the Trial Court abused its discretion in denying the motion for change of venue are all distinguishable on their facts from the instant case. In Hunter v.
Beckley, 129 W.Va.. 302,40 SW 2d 332, wherein the plain13
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tiff was clerk of the circuit court-''by reason of the very
close and intimate connection· which ·a circuit clerk necessarily has in the selection of juries'' (Pg. 336). In Belden
v. Thiel, 211 Wis. 428, 248 NW 417, the trial Court denied
a motion for change of venue in an actio~ in which the
circuit judge was the plaintiff and the case was tried
before a jury, the members of which had served as jurors
during the term of court at which the judge's case was
fried. The appellate Court ordered a new trial and a
change of venue because of the prestige of the office of a
circuit judge and the additional fact that the case was
tried by a jury who had been iin attendance at the court
of said judge as jurors during the entire term at which
said case tried, and thereby had .. had a close association with the judge in the work of the court. State ex rel.,

White Water Association of Primitive Baptists '· H oelscher, Judge, 208 Ind. 334, 196 NE 1, stands for the proposition that transfer should be ordered because of bias of
the trial judge and not because of any apparent bias or
prejudice in the community. The question to be decided
in Tucker v. Gorley, 176 Miss. 708, 170 So. 230, cited in
plaintiff's brief, was not whether there was sufficient evidence to justify the court granting a change of -venue, but
rather whether the court had po,ver to change the place
of trial at all under the particular statutes applic-able in
the State of Mississippi.
It is submitted that the denial by the Trial Court of
plaintiff's motion for a change of venue in the instant
case :was not an abuse of discretion, and plaintiff~s Point
No. I is without merit.
14
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II

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL.
Plaintiff contends that ''the Trial Court a bused its
discretion in refusing to grant plaintiff's motion for new
trial on the ground of surprise through variance in the
deposition and testimony at the trial of the defendant,
John Stocks.'' The claim is based upon the fact that in
his deposition Sheriff John Stocks in answer to several
questions as to what he did and who he saw during the
evening of April 27, 1955, replied that he did not know
or he did not remember, whereas at the time of trial said
defendant gave testimony, supported by other witnesses,
as to his activities during the evening in question. It is
contended that such testimony surprised the plaintiff
and prevented plaintiff from having a fair trial and the
Trial Court in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial
on this ground thereby abused its discretion.
The position of the Utah Supreme Court is clear as
to review by it of decisions of the trial court upon motions
for a new trial. In Moser v. Zion's Co-Op Merca;ntile Inst.,
197 P. 2d 136, the Court stated at page 139 as follows :
''It is a matter now too well settled to admit of any
serious dispute ... that the question of granting or
denying a motion for a new trial is a matter largely
within the discretion of the trial Court. . . . This
Court cannot substitute its discretion for that of
the trial Court. . . . We do not ordinarily interfere with rulings of the trial Court in either granting or denying a motion for new trial and unless
15
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abuse of, or failure to exercise discretion on the
part of the trial judge is quite clearly shown, the
ruling of the trial judge will be sustained.''
The rule was further stated in a more recent case Marshall v. Ogden Union Ry. arnd Depot Co., 221 P. 2d 868, as
follows:
''The granting or denying of a motion for a new
trial is within .the sound discretion of the trial
Court. When a trial Court grants a new trial we
will· not disturb its action unless it is manifestly
apparent that the Court has abused its discretion.
. . . The Court has a great latitude in determining
whether or not to grant such a motion and regardless of whehter ·or not it refuses or grants the
motion this. Court will not disturb its discretion if
such decision has a reasonable basis.''
A comparison of the deposition of defendant John
Stocks and his testimony at the trial does not show that
said defendant stated at one time he ,,~ould testify to a
certain state of facts and then at the trial changed his
statements and stated the facts to be different or to the
contrary. While it is true that the Sheriff replied to several questions at the time his deposition was taken that he
did not recall or did not remember, such is understandable
when it is realized that the deposition 'vas taken more
than a year following the date upon "~hich plaintiff claims
the assault occurred. It is understandable that Sheriff
Stocks would not have a detailed recollection of what
transpired on a day that long ago. Sheriff Stocks did not
know beforehand what questions he would be asked at the
deposition. He had no particular reason or incentive to

16
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undertake measures to refresh his memory as to what
happened on said day prior to the time his deposition
was taken. In answering that he did not know or did
not recall, said defendant was simply telling the truth.
Thereafter, however, faced with a claim against him
which he knew to be false, the Sheriff very naturally did
all things possible to bring to mind events which hap.pened on the day in question. He checked the material at
his disposal and talked to other people, all of which helped
to refresh his memory and enabled him to testify as was
done at the trial (Tr. 211-214).
A review of the entire deposition of the defendant,
John Stocks, indicates a ge·nuine effort on his part to
answer to the best of his recollection and does not show his
answers to be deliberately evasive as claimed by the plaintiff in the isolated examples as shown in plaintiff's brief.
Any claimed variance in the things Sheriff Stocks stated
in his deposition and in his testimony at the trial would
go to the weight of his testimony to be considered by the
jury in determining whether or not he was telling the
truth. The jury was given this opportunity and chose to
believe the defense.
Plaintiff contends as one basis for his surprise that
the defendant Stocks said nothing in his deposition as to
the time of arrest of Edwin John Davis but at the trial he
testified that said arrest was made during the actual
time when plaintiff claimed he was in the custody of the
defendants. The deposition of John Stocks reveals at
page 46 that the entry for April 27, 1955, in the arrest
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book of the Sheriff was read at the deposition arid the
following app.eared therein:
"Edwin John Davis. Held for Herb Snyder, Sheriff, Vernal, Utah."
The· time of day ·of said arrest did not appear in said
entry but plaintiff was put on notice at the taking of the
deposition that a man by the name of Edwin John Davis
was· arrested on said date and held for Herb Snyder,
Sheriff at Vernal, Utah, and assuredly plaintiff cannot
now complain that he had no opportunity to check or
verify the details of said arrest, when it occurred, and
matters connected therewith, such as long distance telephone calls between Sheriff Stocks and Sheriff Snyder.
It is further pointed out that plaintiff's attorney did not
even ask Sheriff Stocks in the deposition as to the time of
day or night that Davis was arrested (Deposition of
John Stocks, 46) .
.Although plaintiff has claimed surprise in the alleged
variance of the testimony of John Stocks at the time his
deposition was taken and at the time of trial to be a
ground for new trial, the record of said trial is completely
silent as to any claimed surprise 'vhile the trial "·as in
session. At no time did plaintiff claim surprise due to
said variance in testimony nor did plaintiff request any
recess or continuance during the trial in order to check
on and investigate the matters upon which plaintiff
now claims surprise. Furthermore, the record sho,vs that
Sheriff Stocks \Vas t~e first 'vitness called for the defense
and testified on the second day of trial, 'vhich 'vas the
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13th day of December, 1956, and the trial continued on
December 14, 1956, and plaintiff had opportunity to check
on the testimony of Sheriff Stocks and present rebutal
testimony on December 14. If plaintiff was surprised by
the testimony of Stocks he had ample opportunity to
check the accuracy of the statements made by Sheriff
Stocks while on the witness stand.
Defendant Tibbetts was with defendant Stocks at all
times in question on April 27, 1955, but plaintiff never
took his deposition or exercised any rights of discovery
to determine what Tibbetts knew about the matters in
question and w.hat he would testify to. Insofar as the defendant Tibbetts is concerned plaintiff clearly has no
basis whatsoever for claiming surprise.
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully submit that the Trial Court
did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion
for change of place of trial nor in denying plaintiff's
motion for a new trial, and submit that the judgment of
the Trial Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
FRANDSEN AND KELLER
By: DuANE A. FRANDSEN
Professional Building
HARRY SNow, Moab, Utah
.Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents.
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